“Cheeki Rafiki” Loss Update

(BLOGGER INSERT - OR WHY YOU SHOULD NOT TAKE A PRODUCTION YACHT ON AN ARCTIC NORTHWEST PASSAGE AND THINK ITS A PRUDENT DECISION)

John Published Oct 13, 2016

https://www.morganscloud.com/2016/10/13/cheeki-rafiki-loss-update/

Overturned hull of the “Cheeki Rafiki”, U.S. Navy photo.

Many of you will remember that I wrote an in-depth opinion piece on the tragic loss of four lives due to the sinking of Cheeki Rafiki and what I see as the total failure of the enquiry report to highlight the real lesson:existing yacht construction rules, particularly as they relate to the keel to hull joint, are nowhere near stringent enough.

Sadly, it seems that nothing is being done about that, though there are other developments, as the director of the sail training firm that managed the boat is being held criminally responsible.

I suppose this is a good development in that it may encourage others to be more careful.

On the other hand, I still feel that the industry and regulators have missed the most important point: if the boat had been properly built no one would have died regardless of what short cuts the management company may, or may not, have taken.

And since the boat was built to applicable standards for offshore work*, surely improving those standards is where we should be looking to improve.

Thanks to Colin Speedie for bringing this to my attention.

*I quote from the report:

ISO 12215-9 defines Design Category A as: ‘category of craft considered suitable to operate in seas with significant wave heights above 4m and wind speeds in excess of Beaufort Force 8, but excluding abnormal conditions such as hurricanes.
With reference to the hindcast weather data for 0300 on 16 May 2014, it is concluded that Cheeki Rafiki was operating within its design category criteria at the time of its loss.

Further Reading (Free)

My in-depth opinion on the accident report.

The official accident report:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/55408664e5274a157200005b/MAIBInvReport_8_2015.pdf

So do your homework... I do not know of any production 'recreation' (sail)boat built to any recognized standard or code which allows or says it meets any compliance for operation in Arctic waters... wrong? Just show me!

So why would you consider taking a vessel (aircraft example) which was not built for Arctic use on a Northwest Passage? You have to be kidding yourself!

Go ahead and make your case below in comments. Please don't say "Because others have done it."

Comments:

Dick Stevenson Oct 13, 2016, 2:16 pm
Hi John,
To some large degree, I feel that having categories that give different levels of scantlings for “offshore” vs “coastal” cruising propagates a myth that is dangerous. A keel falling off near-shore might be less likely to end up in death than offshore, but likely only marginally so. Keels (offshore or coastal designs) should be able to hit a rock at the boat’s cruising speed without integrity compromising damage (and surveyors/repair people need to be more accomplished at diagnosis/repair). Although I will relinquish the point that boats and crew are often beat up worse offshore, I am clear that some of the Alchemy’s (and her crew) most challenging times have been near shore coastal cruising. The myth, to my mind, is that when you go out in a boat locally, that somehow your boat does not need to be as well designed/made nor does the skipper need to be as experienced. In general, this has clear validity, but obscures the fact that when out in a boat, events can take a difficult and deadly turn in ways that most of our activities do not dish out. Being out in a boat has some relatively unique aspects. Mother nature just has a lot more influence on a boater and there are just not always easy and safe alternatives (like pulling over to the side of the road if out driving). In this, I believe that the airplane analogy in your prior essay is relevant: long flight or short, high altitude or low, you do not want any compromises in structural integrity.
Just some random thoughts, not sure where they go.
My best, Dick Stevenson, s/v Alchemy
- John Oct 14, 2016, 7:41 am
  Hi Dick,
  I agree, regardless of the boat’s intended use the keel should be built strong enough so as not to fall off, even if there have been a couple of groundings in her history. To me, that’s the whole point and all the other debate about safety equipment and crew training is just smoke that obscures the basic fact that the scantlings mandated by the regulators are inadequate.
Marc Dacey Oct 13, 2016, 4:00 pm
Good point, Dick. In-shore, one can find both harsher conditions and a 50% reduction of options (or worse, in a bay) than is the case offshore. I’ve seen cases of production boats (but not those built prior to circa 1980, interestingly) in which the tabbing on bulkheads has failed or the hulls have oilcanned in harsh conditions, which should not be the case anywhere, never mind Lake Ontario. I find the aircraft analogy apt and the glossing over of the physics versus dollars argument is a serious shortcoming of an otherwise incisive report.
If this is what “built to (pleasure craft) code” is, then we have issues with the code.
Rob Gill Oct 13, 2016, 7:32 pm
Hi John,
I am interested in what merchant shipping law is deemed to have been broken, when the yacht apparently compiled with Cat 1 and the build standards as required. It will be interesting to find out though as I can’t help feeling this may be a beat-up – the regulators can’t be wrong surely!
However, as I read it Cheeki Rafiki had a mixed usage profile with periods of bare-boat charters and offshore skippered charters. Due to this mixed use, “failure of keel or rudder due to previous unreported grounding” should have been noted as having HIGH risk and HIGH impact in the organisation and vessel’s risk register. I do wonder if Storm Force Coaching had this covered with appropriate strategies for mitigation or minimisation?
Based on 15 years of chartering both in NZ and whilst working overseas (including the UK), I wouldn’t take any vessel that had been in bare-boat charter across the Atlantic, no matter how well equipped.We experienced a litany of failures in charter yacht portholes, rigs, sails, anchors and other equipment failures too numerous to list. The simple fact is that most charterers do not report major incidents for fear of losing their deposit. Scarier still, even if charterers do report a major incident, then this is often treated as “business as usual” for a charter boat. We came out of the Lefkas canal (Greece) under instruction to follow our flotilla leader in line astern and to our (and his) surprise, hitting a rock and coming to a dead stop from six knots – the boat was never even dive inspected. The leader’s comment – “happens all the time Rob, don’t worry about it”.
For a business like Storm Force Coaching, the only effective risk minimisation strategy I can think of would be to remove charterer deposits and mandate full incident reporting encouraged by compulsory replacement insurance cover with no excess fees. The insurance monies then being rigorously applied to inspection and repair. The only risk mitigation strategy I can think of is no mixed use (bare-boat charter / offshore charter) for any vessel – no matter how much the keel-to-hull build regulations are improved in the future.
Kind regards,
Rob
- Alastair Currie Oct 14, 2016, 4:57 am
  The UK Merchant Shipping Act is the law that is being referred to by Criminal Prosecution Service. The yacht is defined as a small ship and there is a responsibility placed on owners and / or agents to send a ship to sea that is fit for purpose. If there is evidence that the yacht was not fit for purpose, or that reasonable information was available that that could be determined, then there might be a case against the owner / agent to prosecuted / defended against.
- John Oct 14, 2016, 7:49 am
  Hi Rob,
  While I agree that taking a boat offshore that has had a hard life in the bareboat trade is a bad idea, I see no reason that the scantlings can’t be beefed up to the point that the keel stays on regardless of poor treatment. In fact the engineering we have done on the A40 shows that a keel can be properly engineered to withstand multiple hull speed groundings for very little money in relation to the price of the boat.
  After all, it’s not just bare boat charters that run aground, I have done that myself!
  Let’s not lose site of the fact that we are building boats that become unsafe after a modest grounding even though they comply with the scantlings mandated by the regulators.
  See my original post for more.
Dick Stevenson Oct 13, 2016, 7:59 pm
Hi Rob,
That was a very interesting analysis.
Thanks, Dick
Roman Oct 14, 2016, 7:40 am
Hi John & others. For exactly the same considerations, which you are describing here, we have changed our mind last year, when we were shopping for a boat for our syndicate: initially, we fell in love with Bavaria 42 Match; but even the structural re-inforcement of the keel attachment, which was mandated on this type after a tragic keel-separation event, did not convince us about its safety. Finally, we purchased a Salona 37, because it has the keel attached to a steel structure, which distributes the load into the fiberglass shell.
I very much agree with your suggestion to change the code. But before that happens, I hope that the mere existence of this thread and the investigation reports would inspire the manufacturers to make improvements; or else they will face negligence claims. Compliance with the code alone is not enough for the shipyards to demonstrate that they have acted with due care. If Salona (and I understand that also a few other ship builders) have adopted a re-inforcement/load distribution steel structure, the economics must work somehow – why would not the others do it, too? If the sailing magazines will not write about it (for obvious reasons), websites like this can – and do – spread the message. And eventually, the customers would vote with their feet and this would make the builders change their way. 10 years ago, this would not have worked, because news did not travel as fast. It is different now, with websites like this one. Who would like to buy a boat, which presents even a non-negligible risk of killing you and your crew due to structural failure? You don’t need to sail across the Atlantic to see this happening. The tragic Bavaria Match event occurred in the Adriatic. On the other hand, I may be wrong about buyers and reputation concerns changing the approach of the ship builders – after all, the Bavaria event is more than 10 years old now and they. And less-than-ideal keel designs are still being manufactured in many places. I wonder how many more sailors must be killed before the codes change. It is always so sad to see regulation where common sense should be doing its job in the first place.
Ernest Oct 14, 2016, 7:49 am
While the stability/integrity discussion is paramount and necessary, I wonder why no one questions the placement of eventually life saving equipment. Not only on Cheeki Rafiki the liferaft has been placed in a position (below a cockpit bench) that had required substantial preparation, something that was not possible due to the immediate characteristics of the catastrophe.
At least when going offshore, better always, the liferaft should be deployable even from a capsized boat, and this is only possible IMHO when mounted externally, e.g. either on the transom or at a suitable position at the deck rail.
Dick Stevenson Oct 14, 2016, 9:33 am
Hi Ernest,
You bring up a dilemma that is not always easy to find discover a good answer for. Your espousal of life rafts externally mounted has a great deal to argue for it. That said, the vast majority of rail and deck mounts I have observed are what I consider near shore installations: installations which would not survive a bad fall off a wave or other deck sweeping events that occur on ocean passages. (A raft just makes for a huge amount of exposed surface area that most rails are not designed for when hit by a wave or a fall off a wave. Raft deck mounts are often just screwed to the deck, not through bolted with backing plates and where the cored deck has been reefed and filled with epoxy. The cradle is often flimsy as well.) Further, they are subject to the elements (many re-packs find water intrusion/damage) and to theft. I believe, for offshore boats, that most anything on deck not in use to run the boat (jerry cans, kayaks, solar on lifelines, etc.) are problematic. There are good solutions, but they often demand considerable foresight at the design level; a dedicated compartment with access from the stern swim platform for example.
We went with a raft which was custom packed in a soft container to fit our cockpit sail locker: lift the lid, then lift it straight out, all done in the cockpit, likely the most secure place on deck in an emergency. That covers the vast majority of raft usages, fortunately a rare event in most cruiser’s lives. In the even less likely event of the boat being inverted, it is necessary to dive down and open the locker. The raft should fall out. Be sure the raft inflating tether is attached to the boat so it inflates as it falls or it will just keep going. Needless to say, I have not practiced the last scenario.
Certainly some compromises embedded in the above, but is what we have come up with.
My best, Dick Stevenson, s/v Alchemy
- Alastair Currie Oct 14, 2016, 12:04 pm
  Life rafts float in the deflated condition. If the upside down locker is underwater the life raft will not fall out. This is why they work with hydrostatic releases. I do not know how easy it would be to force a life raft down into the water and under an upside down coating.